### A2 Alt Causes To Peace

[ ] Democratic spread solves war – No other factor is as statistically significant

Valerie Epps, Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, Spring, ’98
4 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 347

One scholar who has perhaps tried the hardest to separate out other possible influences on conflict is Professor Bruce Russett. Through a series of calibrated tables he has looked at the influence of a variety of factors as well as the fact of democracy itself on conflict. He tests such factors as wealth, economic growth, alliances, contiguity, and military capability ratio. What he finds is that "the effect [of democracy] is continuous, in that the more democratic each member of [any two possible warring states] is, the less likely is conflict between them." n32 He also looks at such variables as political stability, structural/institutional constraints, normative cultural restraints, and even the levels of deaths resulting from political conflict within countries. From his studies he  [\*354]  concludes that: The more democratic are both members of a pair of states, the less likely is it that a militarized dispute will break out between them, and the less likely it is that any disputes that do break out will escalate. This effect will operate independently of other attributes such as the wealth, economic growth, contiguity, alliance or capability ratio of the countries. n33 Russett concludes that the "results do suggest that the spread of democracy in international politics . . . can reduce the frequency of violent conflicts among nations." n34

### A2 Democracies Fight Autocracies

[ ] Democracy ensures a reduction in conflict overall due to norms, not just among democracies

Joshua Muravchik**,** resident scholar The American Enterprise Institute**,** July 11-14, ’01
 http://www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm

One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens . . . will have a great hesitation in . . . . calling down on themselves all the miseries of war." (8) But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. Russett aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not." (9) If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous.

### A2 Transition Wars

Democratization is inevitable, there’s only a risk we make countries more peaceful

Mansfield & Snyder, ’95 [Foreign Affairs, Spring, Edward D. Mansfield, Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Jack Snyder, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University]

THOUGH MATURE democratic states have virtually never fought wars against each other, promoting democracy may not promote peace because states are especially war-prone during the transition toward democracy. This does not mean, however, that democratization should be squelched in the interests of peace. Many states are now democratizing or on the verge of it, and stemming that turbulent tide, even if it were desirable, may not be possible. Our statistical tests show that movements toward autocracy, including reversals of democratization, are only somewhat less likely to result in war than democratization itself. Consequently, the task is to draw on an understanding of the process of democratization to keep its unwanted side effects to a minimum. Of course, democratization does not always lead to extreme forms of aggressive nationalism, just as it does not always lead to war. But it makes those outcomes more likely. Cases where states democratized without triggering a nationalist mobilization are particularly interesting, since they may hold clues about how to prevent such unwanted side effects. Among the great powers, the obvious successes were the democratization of Germany and Japan after 1945, due to occupation by liberal democracies and the favorable international setting provided by the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods economic system, and the democratic military alliance against the Soviet threat. More recently, numerous Latin American states have democratized without nationalism or war. The recent border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador, however, coincide with democratizing trends in both states and a nationalist turn in Ecuadorian political discourse. Moreover, all three previous wars between that pair over the past two centuries occurred in periods of partial democratization. In such cases, however, the cure is probably more democracy, not less. In "Wilhelmine Argentina," the Falkland Islands/Malvinas War came when the military junta needed a nationalist victory to stave off pressure for the return of democracy; the arrival of full democracy has produced more pacific policies. Among the East European states, nationalist politics has been unsuccessful in the most fully democratic ones -- Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary has protest votes have gone to former communists. Nationalism has figured more prominently in the politics of the less democratic formerly communist states that are nonetheless partially democratizing. States like Turkmenistan that remain outright autocracies have no nationalist mobilization -- indeed no political mobilization of any kind. In those recent cases, in contrast to some of our statistical results, the rule seems to be: go fully democratic, or don't go at all. In any given case, other factors may override the relative bellicosity of democratizing states. These might include the power of the democratizing state, the strength of the potential deterrent coalition of states constraining it, the attractiveness of more peaceful options available to the democratizing state, and the nature of the groups making up its ruling coalition. What is needed is to identify the conditions that lead to relatively peaceful democratization and try to create those circumstances. In the long run, the enlargement of the zone of stable democracy will probably enhance prospects for peace. In the short run, much work remains to be done to minimize the dangers of the turbulent transition.

### A2 Democracy Promotion Imperialist

#### No link – we’re about reversal of democratic trends

#### [ ] Democracy promotion is not a manifestation of US imperialism or self-centeredness – it’s a global effort

Carothers, ’94

[Thomas Carothers, founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment. Expert on democracy promotion and democratization. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion.” p. 14]

Another issue for reconsideration is the general view of some human rights advocates that U,S. democracy promotion is highly self-centered activity rooted in the United States' habit of trying to transform the world in its own image. It is true that some democracy assistance programs embody too much of this tendency, yet considerable progress has been made in the past few years toward programs that impart a comparative perspective and promote the sharing of information and experiences between countries in transition to democracy, Although an instinct to remake the world in its image has been part of the international outlook of the United States for generations, the current emphasis on democracy promotion cannot be explained--or dismissed-simply as an external manifestation of that reflex. The German political foundations have been carrying out large-scale democracy promotion assistance in many parts of the world for decades. The British government has recently established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy an organization devoted to promoting democracy abroad, The Japanese government and the European Union arc both seriously exploring the possibility of creating democracy promotion organizations. A number of international organizations. including the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have established democracy promotion units or election units. Some of the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, are approaching political development assistance through the concept of governance. Democracy assistance today is not so much the product of U. S. self-centeredness as a spreading global practice.

### 2ac Rights Malthus

[ ] And democracies are comparatively more effective at protecting the environment then authoritarian regimes

Held & Hervey, ’09 [David Held, [Graham Wallas](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Wallas) Professor of Political Science, Co-director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance within the Government Department at the [London School of Economics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_School_of_Economics), Angus Fane Hervey, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the London School of Economics, “Democracy, climate change and global governance,” November 2009, Policy Network Working Paper, www.policy-network.net/publications\_download.aspx?ID=3426] AP

This type of argument has, however, been undermined by a body of theory arguing that there are a number of reasons why democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to protect environmental quality (Holden, 2002). Democracies have better access to information, with fewer restrictions on media and sources of information, and greater transparency in decision-making procedures. They encourage the advance of science, which is responsible for our awareness about climate change and other forms of environmental threat in the first place (Giddens, 2008: 74). Scientists and other experts are free to engage in research, exchange new evidence and travel to and obtain information from other countries. These factors make it more likely that environmental issues will be identified and placed on the political agenda, and tackled according to appropriate measures of risk. Moreover, concerned citizens can influence political outcomes not only through the ballot box, but through pressure groups, social movements and the free media – channels that are closed in autocracies. The presence of civil society also serves to inform the public, act as a watchdog on public agencies, and directly lobby government (Payne, 1995). There are many examples of cases where environmental interest groups have been able to overwhelm business interests pursuing environmentally damaging practices and of cases where they have changed the public agenda (Falkner, 2007; Bernauer & Caduff, 2004). At the same time, authoritarian regimes have fewer incentives to adopt or stick to sustainable policies. Environmental concerns are often trumped by economic development plans and external security, as was the case with the Soviet regime (Porritt, 1984). Leaders are unaccountable to the public, and have less ground to enact long-term policy (Congleton, 1992). And in authoritarian regimes, those in power control a substantial fraction of society’s resources, encouraging payoffs to a relatively small elite, resulting in less public goods provision (Bueno de Mesquita et. al., 2003). It does not seem unreasonable, then, to expect a strong correlation between democracy and environmental quality.

#### There’s no crunch

Haynes 2008 (Beth Haynes, Professor of Economics at Brigham Young University-Hawaii, “Finite Resources vs. Infinite Resourcefulness”, 8/19/08 <http://wealthisnottheproblem.blogspot.com/2008/08/finite-resources-vs-infinite.html>)

Our consumption is excessive. If we continue to consume our natural resources, there will be nothing left for the future. Use less. Do it for the children! Limit. Limit. Limit. Do it for the poor! A significant number of environmental concerns center on this fear of using up some important resource: oil, rainforest, fresh water, open space, biodiversity. The concern is genuine. The fears are real. People then work to pass laws which intentionally slow production and hinder (even prevent) consumption. The express purpose is to make us poorer in the short run with the hope of preventing poverty in the long run. It’s common sense. Save today in order to have some available tomorrow. It’s how our bank accounts work, so it seems logical to apply the same reasoning to resource use. But there is a catch. All of economic history, up to and including today, demonstrates that the more we exploit our natural resources, the more available they become. (3-7) How can this possibly be? If we use our “limited, non-renewable resources” we have to end up with less, right? Actually, no. And here is why. We don’t simply “use up” existing resources; we constantly create them. We continually invent new processes, discover new sources, improve the efficiency of both use and extraction, while at the same time we discover cheaper, better alternatives. The fact that a particular physical substance is finite is irrelevant. What is relevant is the process of finding ways to meet human needs and desires. The solutions, and thus what we consider resources, are constantly changing. Oil was a nuisance, not a resource, until humans discovered a use for it. In order to survive and flourish, human beings must succeed at fulfilling certain needs and desires. This can be accomplished in a multitude of ways using a multitude of materials. The requirements of life set the goals. How these goals are met does not depend on the existence or the availability of any particular material. Limits are placed not by the finiteness of a physical substance, but by the extent of our knowledge, of our wealth, and of our freedom. Knowledge. Wealth. Freedom. These are the factors which are essential to solving the problems we face. “The Stone Age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.” (8) Think for a minute about how we have solved the problem of meeting basic needs throughout history: Transportation: from walking to landing on the moon Communication: from face-to-face conversations to the World Wide Web. Food: from hunting and gathering to intravenous feeding and hydroponics. Shelter: from finding a cave to building skyscrapers Health care: from shamans to MRIs and neurosurgery. How does progress happen? A synopsis of the process is provided by the main theme of Julian Simon’s book, The Ultimate Resource 2: More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run, the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen, that is, prices eventually become lower than before the scarcity occurred. (9) This idea is not just theory. Economists and statisticians have long been analyzing the massive amounts of data collected on resource availability. The conclusion: our ability to solve the problems of human existence is ever-expanding. Resources have become less scarce and the world is a better place to live for more and more people. (3-7) Overall, we create more than we destroy as evidenced by the steady progress in human well being and there is no evidence for concluding that this trend can't and won't continue. Doomsday predictions have been with us since ancient times and they have consistently been proven wrong.

### Hegemony Inevitable

#### Pursuit of hegemony’s locked-in – the only question is effectiveness

Dorfman 12, Assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs

(Zach What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>)

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

#### Heg is key to decease excess American interventionism

**Kagan and Kristol, 2k** (Robert and William, “Present Dangers”, Kagan is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kristol is the editor of The Weekly Standard, and a political analyst and commentator, page 13-14 )

http://www2.uhv.edu/fairlambh/asian/present\_dangers.htm

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than under the "vital interest" standard. (13). The question, then, is not whether the US should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the US should generally lean forward, as it were, or sit back. A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard is that of a "normal" power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses itself into action.

#### Empirics go aff – hegemony has made war obsolete\*\*

Owen, Professor Politics U of Virginia, ’11 (John, February 11, “Don’t Discount Hegemony” Cato, [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/))

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war);the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

### A2 Counterbalancing

#### Balancing claims against the US are nonfalsifiable – no empirical evidence

Wohlforth, IR Prof @ Dartmouth, ’12

[William Wohlforth, Professor of International Relations at Dartmouth College, “How Not to Evaluate Theories,” International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 219–222]

For nearly 20 years, Layne, Kenneth Waltz, and other balance-of-power realists have proclaimed multipolarity’s imminent return. They have been crystal clear in identifying balancing as the chief causal mechanism that would produce this outcome. Their argument attracted so much attention in large part because it was simple and appeared to flow logically from their theory: ‘‘overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it’’ (Waltz 2000:28). As Layne (1993:92) stressed, ‘‘balancing has especially strong explanatory power in accounting for the [fact] that unipolarity tends to be short-lived …’’ He predicted that ‘‘Unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers, [and will] cause other states to balance against the United States’’ (Layne 1993:51). Waltz (1997:915) agreed: ‘‘Some of the weaker states in the system will … act to restore a balance and move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.’’ In all of the many papers they wrote on the subject, Layne and Waltz consistently claimed to see balancing processes already under way. ‘‘Multipolarity is developing before our eyes,’’ Waltz (1997:915) wrote. ‘‘To all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in according with the balancing imperative’’ (Waltz 1997:915). In my 1999 article, I argued that Layne, Waltz, and other realists were using a theory whose scope conditions did not obtain (Wohlforth 1999). Their theory predicts reactions to a rising power that might attain preponderance, not responses to a state whose preponderance is already firmly established. Even if one accepted the veracity of the whole Waltzian project, I argued, a properly specified theory predicted that unipolarity would be peaceful and durable: peaceful because two key causes for great-power war—systemic balancing and counterhegemonic rivalry—were absent (cf. Monteiro 2012) and durable because the speedy route to equilibrium— balancing—was for all practical purposes not in the cards. My arguments for why balancing was so unlikely came straight from standard realist theory. In a nutshell, the size and comprehensiveness of the capabilities gap meant contenders had a long way to go, and unipolarity’s geography (America’s offshore location, the contenders for peer status all clustered in or around Eurasia) meant that local balancing was likely to impede internal or external efforts to restore systemic equilibrium. Now Layne claims that events verify his arguments. But his essay provides no evidence that balancing has played any causal role, for good reason. As Stephen Brooks and I have shown in detail (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 2008), there simply is no such evidence. It is not just that we see no real balancing: military spending by great powers is at historical lows as a percentage of GDP, and the main alliance formation since 1991 has been the expansion and tightening of US alliances, while China has continued to have only one reliable ally over this entire period: North Korea. Digging deeply into the strategic interactions of contemporary major powers, we found no evidence of more subtle observable implications of balancing dynamics and strong evidence that an important cause of their absence was indeed the high costs of balancing in a unipolar system. What happened? This debate started out being tractable empirically because we all specified observable causal mechanisms, not just predicted outcomes. With time, however, the balance-of-power realists have placed decreasing emphasis on balancing as a cause of structural change to the point that it practically disappears, as in Layne’s current essay. The claim then appears to be that any shift toward a less concentrated distribution of capabilities, whatever the cause, validates the theory. Campbell Craig (2011) puts the bottom line well:

### 2AC Ban T

#### We meet—indefinite detention with a right to habeas corpus isn’t indefinite detention

#### “Restriction” includes an prohibition on action UNLESS another action is taken

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, April 10, 2008, Filed, Appellant., 1 CA-CR 06-0167, 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613, opinion by Judge G. MURRAY SNOW

P10 The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes of the DUI statutes. See generally A.R.S. § 28-1301 (2004) (providing the "[d]efinitions" section of the DUI statutes). In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to ordinary dictionary definitions and do not construe the word as being a term of art. Lee v. State, 215 Ariz. 540, 544, ¶ 15, 161 P.3d 583, 587 (App. 2007) ("When a statutory term is not explicitly defined, we assume, unless otherwise stated, that the Legislature intended to accord the word its natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition.").

P11 The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification." Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999). In fact, "limited" and "restricted" are considered synonyms. See Webster's II New Collegiate Dictionary 946 (2001). Under these commonly accepted definitions, Wagner's driving privileges were "restrict[ed]" when they were "limited" by the ignition interlock requirement. Wagner was not only [\*7] statutorily required to install an ignition interlock device on all of the vehicles he operated, A.R.S. § 28-1461(A)(1)(b), but he was also prohibited from driving any vehicle that was not equipped with such a device, regardless whether he owned the vehicle or was under the influence of intoxicants, A.R.S. § 28-1464(H). These limitations constituted a restriction on Wagner's privilege to drive, for he was unable to drive in circumstances which were otherwise available to the general driving population. Thus, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

#### War powers with detention includes denial of rights + keeping them detained

The Committee on Federal Courts 4 [2004, The Committee on Federal Courts, “THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF "ENEMY COMBATANTS": BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR \*”, 59 The Record 41, The Record of The Association of The Bar of the City of New York]

The President, assertedly acting under his "war power" in prosecuting the "war on terror," has claimed the authority to detain indefinitely, and without access to counsel, persons he designates as "enemy combatants," an as yet undefined term that embraces selected suspected terrorists or their accomplices.

Two cases, each addressing a habeas corpus petition brought by an American citizen, have reviewed the constitutionality of detaining "enemy combatants" pursuant to the President's determination:

- Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696), concerns a citizen seized with Taliban military forces in a zone of armed combat in Afghanistan;

 - Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd sub nom., Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, [\*42] 2004) (No. 03-1027), concerns a citizen seized in Chicago, and suspected of planning a terrorist attack in league with al Qaeda.

Padilla and Hamdi have been held by the Department of Defense, without any access to legal counsel, for well over a year. No criminal charges have been filed against either one. Rather, the government asserts its right to detain them without charges to incapacitate them and to facilitate their interrogation. Specifically, the President claims the authority, in the exercise of his war power as "Commander in Chief" under the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), to detain persons he classifies as "enemy combatants":

- indefinitely, for the duration of the "war on terror";

 - without any charges being filed, and thus not triggering any rights attaching to criminal prosecutions;

 - incommunicado from the outside world;

 - specifically, with no right of access to an attorney;

 - with only limited access to the federal courts on habeas corpus, and with no right to rebut the government's showing that the detainee is an enemy combatant.

#### Means we meet their in the area off—it just means that it includes all areas

#### Their interpretation overlimits to only one aff in each topic area—aff flex ensures innovative topics encouraging research skills and in depth discussions

#### Our interpretation is more precise by citing a court case—that means our limit is predictable and better reflects the topic

#### Default to reasonability—competing interpretations leads to a race to limit out affs at the expense of substance—affs need to know they’re topical

## 2AC K

### 2AC Framework

#### Framework—the primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decisionmakers through a discussion of public policy

#### Decisionmaking skills are necessary to decide between individual courses of action that affect us on a daily basis—flexing our muscles in the high-stakes games of public policymaking is necessary to make those individual decisions easier

#### The neg must connect their alternative to policy concerns and institutional practices—absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A habitus (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the habitus can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the habitus and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the habitus. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### And, debating about the aff is key to solve it—we must keep Guantanamo in the public consciousness in order to organize effective strategies

Cole 12, Professor of Law

[2012, David Cole is a Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “Legal Affairs: Dreyfus, Guantanamo, and the Foundation of the Rule of Law, 29 Touro L. Rev. 43]

Moreover, while district courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction initially ruled in favor of the detainees in the large majority of cases they heard, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has consistently sided with the government on its appeals, and has eased the government's burden to demonstrate that a detainee is lawfully held. n69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari from these D.C. Circuit decisions. n70 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's other post-9/11 national security decisions have all been decided in the government's favor. n71 [\*54] The Court rejected two lawsuits seeking damages against Attorney General John Ashcroft for alleged unconstitutional detentions in the roundups that occurred in the wake of 9/11. n72 And the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the criminalization of pure speech advocating peace and human rights under the "material support" statute. n73 The Court's record on protecting human rights, in short, while better than in previous crises, is mixed. Moreover, most of the Bush administration's curtailments of its aggressive initiatives enumerated above were not ordered by a court. No court ordered the abandonment of the first torture memo, an end to extraordinary rendition, the suspension of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, the release of the secret torture memos, or the closure of the CIA's black sites. n74 Approximately 600 men have been released from Guantanamo, but the vast majority was released without a court order, and none have been released under a non-appealable court order. While several district courts have ordered the release of Guantanamo detainees, every time the administration has appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit"), it has prevailed. n75 No court ordered the administration to abandon the Article II Commander-in-Chief theory of uncheckable executive power. Additionally, as noted above, when the D.C. Circuit ruled that international law did not play any role in constraining the president's detention authority, President Obama in effect objected that the court had granted him too much unchecked authority, and insisted that his actions were bound by international law. What, then, caused the United States, specifically the executive branch, to change course? In my view, they were much the same sorts of forces that worked to vindicate Alfred Dreyfus: not the formal separation of powers, but informal nongovernmental resistance in the name of upholding the rule of law. As in the Dreyfus affair, this resistance took the form of individuals, acting on their own and [\*55] in association with others, speaking out, issuing critical reports, organizing protests, filing lawsuits, and generally challenging perceived abuses of power. n76 As in the Dreyfus affair, the media played a critical role, by disclosing secret rights abuses and writing countless editorials espousing the importance of adhering to the rule of law and the Constitution. Were it not for leaks reported in the media, we would not know about the torture at Abu Ghraib, the torture memo, the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, secret CIA prisons, and extraordinary renditions to torture. In addition, international voices played a major role. Guantanamo, after all, held nationals from forty-two countries, and some of those countries objected strongly to the way their countrymen were treated there. A former United Kingdom Law Lord, Lord Steyn, dubbed Guantanamo a "legal black hole," and 175 members of the Houses of Parliament filed an amicus brief on the Guantanamo detainees' behalf in the Supreme Court. n77 Together, these informal forces are responsible, as much as the formal separation of powers, for reining in the United States' "war on terror" in important ways. What lessons, then, can we draw from the Dreyfus affair and the first post-9/11 decade? The first is that the rule of law and individual rights are all too vulnerable to fear and demagoguery in times of crisis. Designed to constrain short-sighted decision making by insisting on adherence to basic principles of fairness, constitutional rights often seem inconvenient obstacles in a crisis. For Dreyfus and many Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, the law was initially unable to offer much, if any, protection. But both affairs also suggest that the rule of law is more resilient than many cynics might think. Alfred Dreyfus was eventually exonerated. The rule of law recovered in significant measure from its hasty dismissal in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, in both instances, the tide turned only because individuals, associations, and nongovernmental organizations [\*56] mobilized behind the cause of justice for the vulnerable. When it comes to the reality of rights protections, much depends on the mobilization of the polity. But as the other "affair" under examination in this conference - the lynching of American Jewish businessman Leo Frank - chillingly demonstrates, popular mobilization can go either way. n78 When, in 1915, Georgia's governor commuted Frank's death sentence for murder to life without imprisonment, based on substantial concerns with the fairness of the trial and the accuracy of the verdict, a mob gathered, abducted Frank from his cell, and lynched him. n79 Popular mobilization does not always take the side of human rights, and it can easily overwhelm legal bulwarks through brute force and terror. Precisely because they help to establish and reinforce a culture of respect for equality and the rule of law, the assessments and reassessments of the "Dreyfus affair" that continue to this day in France are critically important for sustaining contemporary commitments to the rule of law. The fact that the case has become an "affair," a narrative widely known, exhaustively studied, and frequently invoked is crucial, for the history of the "affair" reminds us of what can go wrong when we depart from principles of fairness and justice. Whether the story of the United States' response to 9/11 will similarly become an "affair" from which the United States and others draw lessons about resisting the temptation to sacrifice our fundamental commitments on the backs of the most vulnerable, remains to be seen. As was the case with Dreyfus for many years, the particular lessons to be drawn from the post-9/11 era are a matter of deep contestation. President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and their supporters have sought to portray their actions as tough, but necessary and reasonable, decisions to recalibrate security and liberty. n80 Others, myself included, have insisted that the principal lesson [\*57] of the first post-9/11 decade is that sacrifices in the rule of law are all too easy to make, generally unnecessary, and come at a great cost to the legitimacy and long-term success of a democracy's struggle against terrorism. The fact that Guantanamo has become one of the world's leading symbols for "lawlessness" suggests that the latter narrative has taken hold, at least in the rest of the world. The struggle over its meaning within the United States, however, continues. n81 At stake is nothing less than the nature of our constitutional culture. Whether, after the next attack, we repeat our mistakes or respond in a more resilient and rights-respecting manner depends ultimately on the lessons we learn as a nation from our recent past. Those who are committed to the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law must continue to work to ensure that the "Guantanamo affair" takes on the character of the "Dreyfus affair" in popular consciousness. At the end of the day, the strength of our legal protections turns on our culture's engaged commitment to the values of the Constitution, the rule of law, and human rights.

#### That’s key—the law is the necessary framework for these challenges to take place

Cole 2011 - Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Winter, David, “WHERE LIBERTY LIES: CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AFTER 9/11,” 57 Wayne L. Rev. 1203, Lexis)

Unlike the majoritarian electoral politics Posner and Vermeule imagine, the work of civil society cannot be segregated neatly from the law. On the contrary, it will often coalesce around a distinctly legal challenge, objecting to departures from specific legal norms, often but not always heard in a court case, as with civil society's challenge to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. Congress's actions on that subject make clear that had Guantánamo been left to the majoritarian political process, there would have been few if any advances. The litigation generated and concentrated pressure on claims for a restoration of the values of legality, and, as discussed above, that pressure then played a critical role in the litigation's outcome, which in turn contributed to a broader impetus for reform.

### Positivism Sufficient/Knowable

#### Their epistemology K is flawed – social constructions are knowable – they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in predictable ways – prefer the specificity of the aff to broad philosophical indictments

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### Rejection of current IR paradigm magnifies hierarchy – emancipation rhetoric gives powerful states a basis for intervention and robs the Third World of agency – traditional security models solve their impacts better

McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Permutation do both

Walby, Sociology Professor at Leeds, ‘1 (Sylvia, Winter, “Against Epistemological Chasms: The Science Question in Feminism Revisited” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol 26 No 2, JSTOR)

Feminist standpoint epistemology and postmodern epistemology often rest on a rejection of "science" and "modernist" modes of reasoning as adequate or sufficient for feminist analysis (Harding 1986, 1991; Nicholson 1990). This rejection is not justified. The account of science in such writings is often oversimplified. First, science is equated with empiricism, which is then falsely conflated with positivism (Harding 1991), to the neglect of the sophisticated and diverse role and nature of reflexive theorization. Second, science is described as monolithic (Haraway 1988), when it is actually internally divided, full of contestation, and subject to change as a result of challenges. Third, science is caricatured as absolutist, as claiming to have discovered the truth about nature and society, despite its internal debates and its continual replacement of old theories with new. Contemporary sociology and philosophy of science undermine these accounts of science as monolithic and absolutist (Quine 1960; Latour 1987, 1993). Fourth, modernist modes of reasoning are often smuggled in unrecognized through the back door (McLennan 1995), since they are actually indispensable for argumentation and in order to avoid the problem of relativism. Empiricist? Harding's (1986, 1991) conflation of the concepts of science and empiricism has led to an unfortunate presumption that a science-based epistemology does not include a significant place for theorization, even though Harding does sometimes appear ambivalent on this point. This may not be a necessary consequence of the use of the term empiricism, but it has nonetheless become presumed within feminist epistemology, at least partially because of the way Harding establishes her authoritative categories. Thus it becomes necessary here to spell out the place of theory in conceptions of science, given this current restrictive set of connotations of the term empiricism. Harding (1991, 79, 110) alleges that science is not only empiricist but also mostly positivist. She cites as support Roy Bhaskar's (1989, 64) suggestion that positivism is the unreflective or spontaneous consciousness of science, although Bhaskar did not carry out studies of scientists himself. She suggests that empiricism involves seeing observational data as the primary and direct basis of our knowledge about the world and its laws of operation, with only a small involvement of theorization, although there is a certain ambiguity and ambivalence in her account of this: "In this sense, empiricism defends experience rather than ideas as the source of knowledge and is thus contrasted with rationalism. Few contemporary scientists or philosophers would want to give such a small role to reason as this definition implies -no one is an empiricist of that sort today- yet many natural and social scientists insist on such remnants of empiricist philosophy as the primacy of observations and 'pure data' and the necessity of knowing that one has the facts" (Harding 1991, 112). While Harding here acknowledges the role of theory and argument in science, she suggests that this is not the practice of contemporary science. She alleges that the confusion lies with the scientists themselves, not those who give accounts of science: Scientists sometimes confuse that philosophy of science called "empiricism" with the idea that it is a good thing to collect evidence about the empirical world. All philosophies of science recommend the latter. Empiricism is that account of such practices associated paradigmaticallv with Locke, Berkeley and Hume and claiming that only sensory experience is the only or fundamental source of knowledge. It contrasts with theological accounts that were characteristic of European science of the Middle Ages, with rationalism, and with Marxist philosophy of science. However, from the perspective of standpoint theory, it also shares key features with one or another of these three philosophies. For example it borrows the monologic voice that seems proper if one assumes the necessity of a unitary and coherent subject of knowledge, as do all three. (Harding 1993, 76) Feminist empiricists, Harding suggests, turn to improved and more rigorous empirical research in order to overcome the biases of androcentric values (1991, 111-12). And, according to Harding, they fail because "thought that begins from the lives of the oppressed has no chance to get its critical questions voiced or heard within such an empiricist conception of the way to produce knowledge" (1993, 56). However, Harding's account, which reduces science to a primary focus on collecting sensory data, is unduly narrow and restrictive. There are problems in its accounts of the philosophy of science, in its representation of empiricism, and in understanding how scientists proceed in practice. Harding underestimates the range of activity within science when she describes scientific practice as primarily one of data collection, devoid of theorization. Rather, the discovery of connections and the development of concepts are core to scientific practice. Harding inappropriately conflates the practical belief of some practicing scientists that there is something out there to be discovered with a naivete about theoretical and conceptual debate. Further, she is incorrect to reduce empiricism to positivism. It is not disputed that the case against simple positivism has been made many times: all observations are theory laden, and so contain presuppositions that themselves need investigation in a chain or net of investigations that constantly tests and retests theories that can be falsified only in a provisional manner (Hempel 1966; Pawson 1989). But positivism and empiricism should not be conflated. Positivism is long surpassed in the social sciences, as has been argued thoroughly in the philosophy and sociology of knowledge (Tudor 1982; Hage and Meeker 1988). For instance, in social statistics it is regarded as elementary that a correlation is not the same thing as a cause but merely a piece of empirical data that can be used within an argument. Empiricism as a philosophy of science has developed a long way beyond positivism. While observation is an irreducible input in scientific knowledge, its relationships with other bodies of knowledge, with theory and with common sense, underpin the more sophisticated empiricism of Quine (1960, 1981), thus taking account of the social processes and context of science. The existence of a nonpositivist science is not provided for within Harding's trilogy. Yet there is a significant tradition of philosophical and sociological work in this area, some of which addresses gender, and some of which does not.6 Bhaskar, for example, has long argued for a philosophy of the social sciences that takes account of thcorr, of unseen social structures, and holds a view that there is something out there to be discovered. But, unfortunately, Bhaskar's realist philosophy is little discussed by Harding (apart from references to his view that scientists are positivists). Yet it might be argued that realism is precisely an example of a theory of knowledge that has been developed to take forward these issues of theory and data in the analysis of the social. His philosophy is now widely used, especially in philosophy of social science in Britain.7 It is an epistemology that presumes that there is a world out there - one that can never be fully known but that can be approached by a mix of empirical research and theory building. It presumes that explanations do not reside in the surface observations that can be made, in the empirical data that can be gathered, but can be constructed on the basis of theory building toward which such data make a necessary but insufficient contribution. Explanations need more than data gathering and must account for the relationships between unobservable social structures. Thus realism presumes a key, though not determining, role for theory. One of the consequences of Harding's tendency to reduce science to an empiricism devoid of theorization is to drive readers toward one of the other two options she offers. But modern philosophy and sociology of science show that it is not accurate or fair to reduce science to an empiricism that is devoid of theorization and connection to other bodies of knowledge. The practice and the philosophy are more sophisticated. Science should not be so quickly dismissed. Realism is a fourth alternative to Harding's trilogy, an alternative to the early naive empiricist positivism that does not require a leap to either standpoint or postmodern epistemologies.